Abstract-We investigate the problem of reliable communication between two legitimate parties over deletion channels under an active eavesdropping (aka, jamming) adversarial model. To this goal, we develop a theoretical framework based on probabilistic finite-state automata to define novel encoding and decoding schemes that ensure small error probability in both message decoding as well as tamper detecting. We then experimentally verify the reliability and tamper-detection property of our scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
The deletion channel is the simplest point-to-point communication channel that models synchronization errors. In the simplest form, the inputs are either deleted independently with probability δ or transmitted noiselessly. As a result, the length of the channel output is a random variable depending on δ. Surprisingly, the capacity of deletion channel has been one of the outstanding open problems in information theory [1] . A random coding argument for proving a Shannon-like capacity result for deletion channel (in general for all channels with synchronization errors) was given by Dobrushin [2] which is recently improved by Kirsch and Drinea [3] to derive several lower bounds. Readers interested in most recent results on deletion channels are referred to the recent survey by Mitzenmacher [4] that provides a useful history and known results on deletion channels.
As the problem of computing capacity of deletion channels is infamously hard, we focus on another problem in deletion channels. In this paper, we study the behavior of the deletion channel under an active eavesdropper attack. Secrecy models in the information theory literature, initiated by Yamamoto [5] , assume that there exists a passive eavesdropper who can observe the symbols being transmitted over the channel. The objective is to design a pair of (randomized) encoder and decoder such that the message is decoded with asymptotically vanishing error probability at the legitimate receiver while ensuring that the eavesdropper gains negligible information about the message. In all secrecy models (see, e.g., [6] - [12] ) the crucial assumption is that the eavesdropper can neither jam the communication channel between legitimate parties nor can she modify any messages exchanged between them. However, in many practical scenarios, the eavesdropper can potentially change the channel, for instance, add stronger noise to change the crossover probability of a binary symmetric channel or the deletion probability of a deletion channel.
In our adversarial model, we assume that two parties (say Alice and Bob) wish to communicate over a public deletion channel while an eavesdropper (say Eve) can potentially tamper with the statistics of the channel. We focus on deletion channel and assume that Eve can have possibly more bits deleted, and hence increases the deletion probability of the channel. The objective is to allow a reliable communication between Alice and Bob (i.e., with vanishing error probability) while taking Eve's action into consideration. To this goal, we design (i) a randomized encoder using probabilistic finite-state automata (PFSA) which, given a fixed message, generates a random vector as the channel input and (ii) a decoder which generates an estimate of the message only when the channel is not tampered. In case the channel is indeed tampered, the decoder can declare it with asymptotically small Type I and Type II error probabilities. It is worth mentioning that the rate of our scheme is (almost) zero and hence we do not intend to study capacity of deletion channels.
Unlike the classical channel coding where the set of all possible channel inputs (aka, codebook) must be available at the decoder, our scheme requires that only the set of PFSA's used in the encoder to be available at the decoder, thus the name semi-universal. This model might be contrasted with universal channel coding [13] where neither channel statistics nor codebook are known at the decoder and the main goal is to find the pattern of the message.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define briefly the framework of PFSA and discuss their properties required for our scheme. Section III specifies the channel model, encoder, decoder, and different error events. In Section IV, we discuss the effects of deletion channels on PFSA-based communication scheme. Section V concerns the theoretical aspects of our coding scheme and Section VI contains several experimental results. Proofs of the results are available in [14] . Notation: We use calligraphic uppercase letters for sets (e.g., S), sans serif font for functions (e.g., T), uppercase letters for matrices (e.g., Γ), bold lower case letters for column vectors (e.g., v). Throughout, we use g to denote a PFSA and s and x to denote its state and symbol, respectively. We use x n = x 1 , . . . , x n for a sequence of symbols. The ith entry of vector v is denoted by v i Given a matrix A, we denote by A i,· its ith row, by A ·,j its j-th column, and by A i,j its (i, j) entry. We use (a x ) x∈X to denote a vector with the entry indexed by X , [a x ] x∈X a matrix with the column indexed by 
II. PROBABILISTIC FINITE-STATE AUTOMATA
In this section, we define probabilistic finite-state automata [15] , [16] (PFSA) and discuss a few properties required in the subsequent sections.
Definition 1 (PFSA).
A PFSA g is a quadruple g = (S, X , T, P), where S is a finite state space, X is a finite alphabet, T : S × X → S is the state transition function, and P : S × X → [0, 1] specifies the conditional distribution of generating a symbol conditioned on a state.
In fact, a PFSA is a directed graph with a finite number of vertices (i.e., states) and directed edges emanating from each vertex. An edge from state s ∈ S to state s ′ ∈ S is specified by two labels: (i) a symbol x ∈ X that updates the current state from s to s ′ , that is, T(s, x) = s ′ , and (ii) the probability of generating x when the system resides in state s, i.e., P(s, x). For instance, T(s, 1) = t and P(s, 1) = 0.7 in the PFSA described in Fig. 1 , thus, the system residing in states s evolves to state t with probability 0.7 and generates symbol 1. Clearly, x∈X P(s, x) = 1 for all s ∈ S. Letting X * denote the set of all possible concatenations of finitely many symbols from X and λ denote the empty sequence, one can easily proceed to define T (s, x n ) recursively as T T s, x (n−1) , x n for each x n ∈ X * and s ∈ S, with the base case T (s, λ) = s. We say that a PFSA is strongly connected if for any pair of distinct states s and s ′ , there exists a sequence x n ∈ X * such that T (s, x n ) = s ′ . The transition matrix P is an |S|×|S| matrix given by
, and the observation matrix P is an |S|×|X | matrix given by
We denote by G the set of all strongly connected PFSA. The significance of strongly connected PFSA is that their corresponding Markov chains, i.e., the Markov chain with state space S and transition matrix P , has a unique stationary distribution (thus initial state can be assumed to be irrelevant). The stationary distribution of g is defined to be the stationary distribution of Markov chain P and is denoted by p g , or simply by p if g is understood from the context.
A PFSA g can be uniquely determined by a set of matrices [15] 
Fig. 2. A communication system with an active eavesdropper
We call the set Γ the Γ-expression of PFSA g. The transition matrix P and the observation matrix P can then be represented in terms of Γ-expression as P = x∈X Γ x and P = Γ x 1 |S| x∈X where 1 n is the all-one vector of size n. The Γ-expression for the PFSA illustrated in Fig. 1 is as follows: Clearly, all matrices in Γ-expression for any PFSA must have only one positive element in each row. However, one can define generalized PFSA by removing this constraint.
Definition 2 (Generalized PFSA). We say that g is a generalized PFSA if its Γ-expression has matrices Γ x with more than one positive entries in each row.
To define a generalized PFSA in the quadruple form as in Def. 1, we have P(s, x) = s ′ ∈S Γ x (s, s ′ ), analogous to PFSA. However, T(s, x) can no longer be defined to be a state, but rather a probability distribution on the states given by Γ x s,· /P(s, x), when P(s, x) is not zero. Shannon [17] appears to be the first one who made use of PFSA to describe stationary and ergodic sources. Given g ∈ G, first a state s 1 is chosen randomly according to the stationary distribution, then a symbol x 1 is generated with probability P(s 1 , x 1 ) which takes the system from state s 1 to state s 2 . A new symbol x 2 is then generated with probability P(s 2 , x 2 ). Letting this process run for n time steps, we obtain a sequence x n = x 1 x 2 . . . x n . In this case, we say that x n is a realization of g and we denote this fact by x n ← g. According to Shannon, each state s i captures the "residue of influence" of the preceding symbol x i−1 on the system.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SETUP
Suppose Alice has a message M which takes value in a finite set M := {1, 2, . . . , |M|} and seeks to transmit it reliably to Bob over a deletion channel W(δ) with deletion probability δ ∈ [0, 1]. The channel is assumed to be public, that is, an active eavesdropper, say Eve, can access and possibly tamper with the channel. For simplicity, we assume that Eve may delete extra bits and thus changing the channel from
The objective is to design a pair of encoder ϕ and decoder ψ that enables Alice and Bob to reliably communicate over W(δ) only when he is ensured that the channel is not tampered with. In classical information theory, the decoder must be tuned with the channel statistics. Hence, reliable communication occurs only when Bob knows the deletion probability δ. However, Eve might have tampered with the channel and increased deletion probability to δ ′ , and since Bob's decoding policy was tuned to δ, this might cause a decoding error regardless of Bob's decoding algorithm. Therefore, reliability of the decoding must be always conditioned on the fact that the channel has not been tampered with during the communication.
Motivated by this observation, we propose the following coding scheme. We first propose a two-step encoder: each message M = m is first sent to a function ι : M → G M which maps m to a PFSA g m in G M := {g 1 , . . . , g |M| }, then another function ω : G M → X n generates x n a realization of PFSA g m and sends it over the memoryless channel W(δ). Therefore, the encoder function ϕ : M → X n is the composition ι • ω (see Fig. 2 ). Unlike the classical setting, Bob need not know the set of all channel inputs x n for each m ∈ M (aka, codebook). Instead, we assume Bob knows G M (thus the name semi-universal scheme). The output of the channel y ℓ is an X -valued random vector whose length ℓ is a binomial random variable Bin(n, 1 − δ) (corresponding to how many elements of x n are deleted). Upon receiving y ℓ , Bob applies ψ :
to generate ψ y ℓ = M , T whereM is an estimate of Alice's message and T specifies whether or not the channel has been tampered with. He then declaresM as the message only when T = 0. Therefore, the goal is to design (ϕ, ψ) such that for sufficiently large n Pr(T = 0 | channel is tampered)
and simultaneously
for uniformly chosen message M ∈ M. We say that the reliable tamper-free communication is possible if (1) and (2) hold simultaneously for any ǫ > 0.
IV. PFSA THROUGH DELETION CHANNEL
If x n ← g is fed to the channel W(δ), then is there a g(δ) ∈ G such that y ℓ ← g(δ)? In this section, we address this question by deriving the Γ-expression of g(δ). In particular, we show that the output of channel W(δ) can be equivalently generated by a generalized PFSA g(δ) whose Γ-expression follows a simple closed form. We conclude this section by introducing the class M2 of PFSA which is closed under the deletion action, i.e., if g belongs to M2, then so does g(δ). Before stating the main result, we will define the likelihood of a PFSA which is required in our decoding algorithm.
A. Likelihood Probability of a PFSA
We wish to compute p g (x n ) the probability that a given sequence x n is generated by a PFSA g. First notice that we can write
where p g (x 1 ) = p x1 and p g (x i |x i−1 ) for i = 2, . . . , n denotes the probability that g generates x i conditioned on the fact that x i−1 ← g. After x 1 is generated, the distribution on state space evolves from stationary distribution to p
. By the definition ofP , it is then clear that p g (x 2 |x 1 ) = (p T 1P ) x2 . After generating x 2 , then the state distribution evolves to p 
B. PFSA over W(δ)
Assume x n ← g is transmitted over W(δ) and y ℓ is observed as the output. As mentioned earlier, our main goal is to specify g(δ) such that y ℓ ← g(δ). The following theorem, which is the main result of our paper, states that the generator of the output has a simple expression. However, g(δ) need not be in G, i.e., it may be a generalized PFSA. We will provide an example to illustrate this fact.
Theorem 1. If x
n ← g is the input to the channel W(δ), then the output sequence is a realization of the generalized PFSA g(δ) with Γ-expression given by Γ δ = Γ δ,x = Q(P, δ)Γ x |x ∈ X , where
and I is the |S|×|S| identity matrix.
Notice that while the stochastic matrix P may not be invertible, I − δP is non-singular for all δ ∈ [0, 1), as the the eigenvalues of P are all less than or equal to 1. Moreover, it is straightforward to check that Q(P, δ) is also a stochastic matrix with p g being its unique stationary distribution.
For instance, if x n ← g with g described as in which clearly illustrates that g(δ) is a generalized PFSA.
C. Class M2
As indicated by the above example, g(δ) is a generalized PFSA in general. Nevertheless, there is a subset of G that is closed under the action of W(δ). This family of PFSAs, which we call M2, is the collection of PFSAs with binary state space S = {s 0 , s 1 } on a binary alphabet X = {0, 1} specified by Γ-expression:
for µ, ν ∈ (0, 1). Since the space M2 can be fully represented by µ and ν, we denote any g ∈ M2 by g (µ,ν) . It is straightforward to check that the Γ δ,0 and Γ δ,1 corresponding to g ∈ M2 have only one non-zero entry in each row, implying that g(δ) ∈ M2 for any δ ∈ (0, 1). See Fig. 3 for an example. In Fig. 4 , we show the effect of deletion probability on M2. Each dot in (a) represents a g (µ,ν) with µ and ν both ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 with 0.01 increment. Dots in (b), (c), and (d) represent the corresponding g (µ,ν) (δ) for each pair (µ, ν) and δ = 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, respectively. While δ increases, the dots are moving towards the µ = ν line.
Thanks to the closedness property of M2 under the deletion action, one can translate the problem of tamper detection and decoding into a 2-dimensional geometric problem. For simplicity, we only focus on M2 in the passing. The treatment for the general PFSA is left for the future research.
V. THE CONVERGENCE OF LIKELIHOOD
In this section, we describe our algorithms for decoding and tamper detecting under the assumption that the encoder is constrained to M2, i.e., G M ⊂ M2. Since the channel output is equivalently generated by a PFSA in M2, we use x n instead of y ℓ to denote the output sequence. 1 We wish to employ the maximum likelihood framework to design the decoder. To this end, we first need to define the likelihood of a PFSA given the output sequence. We then show that the likelihood is closely related to the KL divergence between two PFSAs.
It can be proved that this limit exists under some mild conditions on the transition matrix P [14] . Deriving a closed form expression for the KL divergence between any two PFSAs in G seems intractable. Nevertheless, once we constrain our attention to M2, the KL divergence has a simple expression, as shown by the following theorem.
where D KL (a b ) := a log a b +ā logā b for a, b ∈ (0, 1).
C. Convergence of log likelihood
Recall that p g (x n ) represents the probability that x we need the following notation. If x n is a realization of g, then define
where p g ′ (x n ) is computed according to the procedure given in Section IV-A.
Theorem 5. We have with probability one
as n → ∞.
When the generating PFSA g is not known, we use L (g ′ , x n ) to identify the log likelihood of g ′ as the generator of x n .
VI. ALGORITHM AND SIMULATION
Assume that the encoder is given by a set of fixed PFSAs G M = g 1 , . . . , g |M| where g i ∈ M2 for all i ∈ M := {1, . . . , |M|}. We then wish to construct the decoding and also the tamper detection algorithms for this given encoder. We will briefly discuss heuristics on how to obtain a set of PFSAs that are good for tamper detecting and decoding in Section VI-C.
A. Decoding Algorithm
In light of Theorem 5, we have that for i = j
which motivates the following definition for the decoding function in Fig. 2 ψ
Applying ψ to decoding two different message sets with |M|= 10 and 20, respectively, over W(0.2), we record the results in 
B. Tamper Detecting Algorithm
Suppose Eve tampers with the channel and increase the deletion probability from δ to δ ′ in such a way that δ ′ −δ > η with some η ≥ 0. Putting Theorems 3 and 5 together, we obtain for i = j
Hence, tampering with the channel results in an increase in the likelihood. This leads to our temper detecting procedure detailed in Algorithm 1. Table I records the error rates of Algorithm 1 for sending 10 messages through W(0.2). We generate 50 test sets containing k = 200 sequences, with 20 for each message. We randomly pick a test set and tamper with the channel during the communication. For simplicity, if a test set is selected, it will have a fixed deletion probability δ ′ = 0.3 instead of δ = 0.2. We run the algorithm for input sequences of length 50, 100, 150, and 200, and for cutoff values ε = 0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, and 0.25. For each block in Table I , the first column is the rate of failing to detect a tampering, the second column is the rate of false alarm of a tampering, and the last column is the sum of two error rates. We see that as the cutoff value ε increases, the false alarm significantly decreases without too much increase in the rate of failing to detect a true tampering. 
C. Generate Well-Separated PFSAs in M2
For fixed number of messages, we need to choose a set of M2 PFSAs with the best decoding and tamper detection performance. It is worth mentioning that (i) decoding error will be significantly lowered by increasing D(g i g j ) according to (4) , and (ii) the tampering detection error will be improved by making the gap H(g(δ ′ )) − H(g(δ)) as large as possible for δ ′ − δ ≥ η according to (5) . However, these two goals are conflicting and call for a tradeoff: increasing pairwise KL divergence requires g i 's to be spread evenly in the parameter space while increasing the gap in the difference of entropies is obtained by enlarging |µ − ν|.
Here, we describe briefly how we design G M for experiments demonstrated in Fig. 5 . As a naive way, we start off with |M| randomly generated µ's in (0, 1), and for each of them we generate ν in the following way: if µ > 0.5, then we choose a ν randomly in (0, µ − 0.2), and if µ ≤ 0.5, we choose a ν randomly in (µ + 0.2, 1). Then, we use a hillclimbing algorithm to maximize minimum pairwise averaged KL divergence, 0.5 (D KL (g 1 g 2 ) + D KL (g 2 g 1 )) , between all pair of PFSAs. Let σ be the step size, for a pair g (µ1,ν1) and g (µ2,ν2) with minimum averaged KL divergence, we search in the four neighboring points, (µ i ± σ, ν i ) and (µ, ν i ± σ) with i = 1, 2 for an improvement. We exit the search when there is no improvement to be found.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we developed a novel coding scheme for information transfer over a public deletion channel subject to an active eavesdropper. Our coding scheme is based on probabilistic finite-state automata (PFSA) and is shown to have (1) semi-universal property, in a sense that codebook need not be available at the decoder, (2) small error probability when decoding messages, and (3) tamper-free property, which alarms the decoder about possible tampering. As the first attempt to exploit the PFSA structure in a secure information-theoretic communication scheme, this work presents an exploratory study and deeper theoretical studies are left for future work. In particular, we wish to
• derive the convergence rate of log likelihood in Theorem 5 for general PFSA (as opposed to M2) as an attempt to have a deeper analysis of error probability, • design encoders and decoders beyond the binary family of PFSAs, namely M2. To this end, fist we need to find an analytic way to compute entropy rate and KL divergence for generalized PFSA.
